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Volume 43 Winter 1978 Number 1
PROSPECTIVE APPLICATIONS OF THE
ARTICLE IV PRIVILEGES AND




There has been substantial litigation in the last decade concerning
the extent to which individual states may discriminate against nonresi-
dents. ' The states regularly give preference to state residents in admis-
sion to state institutions of higher education,2 in the fee structure of
such institutions,3 in the fee structure for hunting and fishing licenses,4
in admission to the practice of law,5 and in granting subsidies to local
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia; B.S., North
Dakota State University, 1966; J.D., University of Minnesota, 1968.
1. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (divorce); Memorial Hosp. v.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (nonemergency hospitalization); Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (programs dealing with abortions); Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U.S. 331 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See also
Note, Durational Residence Requirements from Shapiro Through Sosna: The Right to
Travel Takes a New Turn, 50 N.Y.U.L. REv. 622 (1975).
2. See Clarke, Validity of Discriminatory Nonresident Tuition Charges in Public
Higher Education Under the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause, 50 NEB. L.
REv. 31 (1971).
3. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F.
Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970) (three judge court), aff'd., 401 U.S. 985 (1971). See
also Clarke, supra note 2.
4. Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S.
385(1948). Section 252.030, RSMo 1969 provides in part: "Itihe ownership of
and title to all wildlife of and within the state, whether resident, migratory or
imported, dead or alive, are hereby declared to be in the state of Missouri. This
statute gives the Missouri Department of Fish and Game the right to make reg-
ulations." The state regulations provide for a higher fee for nonresident hunting
and fishing licenses than for resident licenses.
5. See, e.g., Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257 (D.N.M.), aff'd sub noam.
Rose v. Bondurant, 409 U.S. 102 (1972); Kennan v. Board of Law Examiners,
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businesses. 6 In addition to simple residency requirements, many states
also impose durational residency requirements.7  The latter require an
individual to have been a state resident for a particular period of time
before being entitled to benefits or opportunities on the same basis as
longer-term residents. For example, mere state residence may not entitle
an individual to lower tuition at a state college; he may be required to
have been a resident for one year before reduced fees are available.8
Similar durational residency provisions also have been imposed with re-
spect to resident fees for hunting and fishing licenses,' to qualification
for state welfare benefits,' 0 and to access to state courts for the purpose
of getting a divorce."
This type of discrimination raises the question of the extent to
which the states may discriminate on the basis of residency or length of
residency. Such discrimination has been challenged on various theories,
the most frequent being that such state discrimination violates the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.1 2 Equal protection
analysis will invalidate such discrimination only if the residency require-
ments are wholly irrational, unless the challenger can establish that the
discrimination based on residency has the effect of a penalty on his
exercise of the right to travel.' 3  When the residency requirement is
found to penalize the exercise of the right to travel, the state must dem-
317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970). See also Note, supra note 1, at 645. Manyjurisdictions require some form of residency before an individual can be admit-
ted to practice of law within the state. Many jurisdictions impose a residency
requirement before the individual may take the bar exam; many allow nonresi-
dents to take the exam but require that the individual be a resident of the state
before he is admitted to the bar. Some also impose durational residency re-
quirements of anywhere from 30 days to six months before the individual is
allowed either to take the exam or to engage in the practice of law within the
state. A summary of the state requirements is contained in Alphabetical State-by-
State Listings of Bar Requirements, 2 BEFORE THE BAR 7 (1976).
6. See, e.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (a state
subsidy had the effect of benefitting local businesses to the exclusion of nonresi-
dents).
7. Many of the cases cited in notes 1-7 supra concerned durational residency
requirements. Durational residency requirements have the affect of excluding
nonresidents as well as short-term residents, and appear to be favored by the
states at the present time. See Note, supra note 1.
8. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
9. See note 4 supra.
10. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
11. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
12. See Note, supra note 1; Comment, The Right to Travel: In Search of a Con-
stitutional Source, 55 NEB. L. REv. 117 (1975).
13. The equal protection clause has been relied upon by attorneys to chal-
lenge discrimination against nonresidents and short-term residents, but such use
is being limited by the Supreme Court. See Note, supra note 1. Challenges to state
discrimination against nonresidents or durational residency requirements based
[Vol. 43
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onstrate a compelling state interest in order to uphold the require-
ment.14 The difficulty lies in determining whether a penalty exists; that
is, whether the result is "sufficiently analogous to a criminal fine to jus-
tify strict judicial scrutiny." 5
on an equal protection theory are not having as much success as in prior years.
The Supreme Court has stated that when durational residency requirements
merely affect the desirability of travelling or moving into the state, such re-
quirements are valid if there is any rational basis for them. Sosna v. Iowa, 419
U.S. 393 (1975); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). Such
requirements are not invalid on this ground unless they penalize individuals for
exercising their right to engage in interstate travel.
The adoption of the "penalty" theory is of relatively recent vintage, and
it is difficult to determine when the courts will say that a residency requirement
constitutes a penalty. In Maher v. Roe, 45 U.S.L.W. 4787, 4790 n.8 (1977), the
Court discussed the penalty theory:
Appellees' reliance on the penalty analysis of Shapiro and Maricopa
County is misplaced. In our view there is only a semantic difference
between appellees' assertion that the Connecticut law unduly inter-
feres with a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy and their
assertion that it penalizes the exercise of that right. Penalties are
most familiar to the criminal law, where criminal sanctions are im-
posed as a consequence of prescribed conduct. Shapiro and Maricopa
County recognized that denial of welfare to one who had recently
exercised the right to travel across state lines was sufficiently
analogous to a criminal fine to justify strict judicial scrutiny.
If Connecticut denied general welfare benefits to all women who
had obtained abortions and who were otherwise entitled to the ben-
efits, we would have a close analogy to the facts in Shapiro and strict
scrutiny might be appropiate under either the penalty analysis or
the analysis we have ap ied in our previous abortion decisions. But
the claim here is that the state "penalizes" the woman's decision to
have an abortion by refusing to pay for it. Shapiro and Maricopa
County did not hold that states would penalize the right to travel in-
terstate by refusing to pay the bus fares of the indigent travelers.
We find no support in the right to travel cases for the view that
Connecticut must show a compelling interest for its decision not to
fund elective abortions.
The Court in Maher found the Connecticut funding scheme did not constitute a
penalty and upheld the distinction drawn by regulation between childbirth and
nontherapeutic abortion as being "rationally related" to a "constitutionally per-
missible" purpose. See also Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 314 (1975); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972). If it also must be
shown that the state's purpose was to discourage migration, it will be even more
difficult to successfully challenge discrimination against nonresidents, because
purpose may be hard to prove. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040
(1976).
14. The result of finding no penalty on the right to travel is that the restric-
tion is presumptively constitutional, placing the burden on the challenger to
show that the classification is irrational. The law merely need be rationally re-
lated to a permissible purpose to be upheld. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969). See also City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 96 S. Ct. 2513 (1976); Sosna
v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); City of Charlotte v. Local 660, Int'l Ass'n of
Firefighters, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
15. See note 13 supra.
1978]
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The commerce clause also has been used to challenge discrimination
against nonresidents. 1 6 That clause prohibits state discrimination
against interstate commerce unless justified by the existence of a com-
pelling state interest.17  It also prohibits the states from placing undue
burdens on interstate commerce.18 Because interstate travel is included
in interstate commerce, 19 a state may not prohibit or regulate interstate
travel in a discriminatory fashion.2 0  Most state discrimination against
nonresidents, however, is not clearly directed against interstate travel it-
self. No penalties or special assessments are directly imposed on travel,
and no one is excluded from the state. Therefore, such regulation is not
presumptively unconstitutional. It also could be argued that regulations
restricting an individual's freedom of mobility or discouraging his mov-
ing from one state to another constitute undue burdens on interstate
commerce and therefore are invalid. These arguments are beyond the
scope of this article.
There is a related argument that discriminatory state regulations in-
fringe upon the individual's constitutional right to engage in interstate
travel 21-a right separate and apart from the protections of the com-
merce clause and equal protection clause. The source of the constitu-
tional right of travel is somewhat mysterious; it is partially a product of
the commerce clause, the article IV privileges and immunities clause,
and the equal protection clause. Challenges based on the right of travel
seldom arise for two reasons: states rarely try to keep anyone out of the
state, 2 2 but merely condition opportunities or receipt of state benefits on
16. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
17. See Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875). This concept has not changed
significantly in the last 100 years except for the limitations imposed by Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
18. See Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964);
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
19. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1 (1824).
20. Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 96 S. Ct. 923 (1976); Breard v. City
of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S.
349 (1951); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
21. See Comment, supra note 12. Although the Court has not clearly indi-
cated the source of this right, it certainly does exist. When a state has tried to
totally exclude people from the state, it generally has met with a lack of success.
See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). The recent cases raising signifi-
cant problems are those involving limiting city growth and the number of build-
ing permits available. See, e.g., Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956
(1st Cir. 1972); Construction Indus. Ass'n v. Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D.
Cal. 1974), rev'd, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
See Comment, The Right to Travel: Another Constitutional Standard for Local Land
Use Regulation?, 39 U. CHi. L. REv. 612 (1972). See also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1
(1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
22. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). This case stopped state ef-
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residency of a particular duration; and residence cases usually have been
decided on equal protection grounds rather than on a travel theory.23
However, the emphasis could change; the potential key issue could be
whether the limitation on receiving benefits is an undue or impermissi-
ble burden on the right to travel. Discrimination by the states also could
be challenged under state equal protection clauses. 24
The article IV privileges and immunities clause provides an alter-
nate means, in addition to the usual theories, to challenge state discrimi-
nation against nonresidents. This article will attempt to explore the arti-
cle IV privileges and immunities clause (hereinafter referred to as article
IV P & I) and the extent to which it can be used to challenge such
discrimination. Article IV P & I analysis often is overlooked but can be
useful, 25 especially since the Supreme Court is retracting the broad
coverage provided to nonresidents under the equal protection clause.26
II. ARTICLE IV PRIVILGES AND IMMUNITIES
Article IV, section 2 of the United States Constitution provides in
paragraph 1: "The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of the citizens in the several states." It is, and historically
was intended to be, a limitation on the power of the states to discrimi-
nate against the citizens of other states,27 and is therefore a provision
specifically concerned with discrimination against nonresidents. 28
The clause is a direct descendent of Article IV of the Articles of
Confederation 2 9 and, although there is some dispute as to the historical
23. See cases cited note 1 supra. Because the state statutes discriminated
against those who recently moved into the state, an equal protection argument
easily was made and frequently was successful because discrimination which
penalized a person for engaging in travel required substantial justification to be
upheld.
24. Many state constitutions have equal protection clauses. The state con-
stitutions should not be overlooked as a source of authority to challenge any kind
of discrimination.
25. See, e.g., Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975); Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973). See also Massachusetts v. Westcott, 97 S. Ct. 1755 (1977);
cases cited notes 73-100 infra.
26. See notes 13-15 supra.
27. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869). See also Austin v. New
Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975); Antieau, Paul's Perverted Privileges or the True
Meaning of The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four, 9 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1 (1967).
28. See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975) in which the Court
suggested that at least with respect to discriminatory taxes, nonresidents would
be entitled to the protection of the clause. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385
(1948); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 79 (1920); Chalker v.
Birmingham & Nw. Ry., 249 U.S. 522 (1919); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239,
247 (1898). See also Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929);
LaTourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919).
29. Many take the view that the article IV privileges and immunities clause is
a reenactment of article IV of the Articles of Confederation which provided:
1978]
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meaning of article IV P & I, the generally accepted purpose is:
to declare to the several states that whatever those rights, as you
grant or establish them to your own citizens, or as you limit or
qualify, or impose restrictions on their exercise, the same,
neither more no less, shall be the measure of the rights of citi-
zens of other states within your jurisdiction.3 0
This application of the privileges and immunities clause is identified as
the comity theory."1 It protects the citizens of state A, who are traveling
or residing in state B, from unreasonable discrimination by state B with
respect to fundamental rights (privileges and immunities).3 2 As such, it
is similar to the commerce clause which prohibits the states from dis-
criminating against interstate commerce. 33 Therefore, cases decided
under the commerce clause are helpful in ascertaining the scope and
application of article IV P & I.34
[tihe better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and inter-
course among the people of the different states in this union, that
free inhabitants of each of these states, paupers, vagabonds fugitives
from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and im-
munities of free citizens in the several states; and the people of each
state shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other state,
and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce,
subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabi-
tants thereof respectively ....
See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975). Draft Two of the proposed
article VI of the Articles of Confederation provided that "[i]nhabitants of each
Colony shall henceforth always have the same Rights, Liberties, Privileges, and
Advantages in the other Colonies which the said Inhabitants now have in all
Cases whatever except in those provided for by the next following Article." Arti-
cle VII provided that "[t]he Inhabitants of each Colony should enjoy all the
Rights, Liberties, Privileges, and Advantages in Trade, Navigation, and Com-
merce in any other Colony and in going to and from the same into any part of
the World in which the Natives of such Colony enjoy." Antieau, supra note 27, at
2, citing 5 JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 547 (1906). Article IV P & I may
have been derived from all of the above provisions.
30. Butchers' Benevolent Ass'n v. Cresent City Live-Stock and Slaughter-
House Co. [Hereinafter cited as Slaughter-House Cases], 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,
77 (1872).
31. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975). See Toomer v. Witsell,
334 U.S. 385 (1948).
32. See text accompanying notes 66-103 infra; Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S.
385 (1948).
33. Id. at 395, 396. In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794
(1976) this similarity became clear when the Court relied upon article IV P & I
cases to ascertain the limits of the commerce clause.
34. A comparison of the language used in cases stating the purposes of both
article IV P & I and of the commerce clause is interesting. It is stated that article
IV P & I was taken from the fourth of the Articles of Confederation which was
prefaced as follows: "[t]he better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and
intercourse among the people of the different states of the union." In Paul v.
Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868) the Court said:
Indeed, without some provisions of the kind removing from the citi-
zens of each State the disabilities of alienage in the other States and
giving them equality of privilege with citizens of those States, the
[Vol. 43
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The comity theory underlying the privileges and immunities clause
was thought necessary to satisfy a perceived need to unify the nation as
it was developing in the 1800's 3 5 and to prevent jealous and destructive
competition among the states.36 It was recognized that the states had a
tendency to provide benefits to their own citizens but to exclude citizens
of other states from such benefits.3 7  There was some suggestion that
certain rights, such as access to the courts and equal treatment under the
laws of each state,3 ought to be provided to all individuals regardless of
their state citizenship. The hope was to form one unified country. 39
This view of history prompted the adoption and continued application 4
0
of the comity theory by the Supreme Court. Because this interpretation
gives rights to citizens of other states, the clause is often referred to as
the interstate privileges and immunities clause. 41 Questions have arisen
whether the Supreme Court has been correct in continued use of the
comity theory, 42 but the theory recently has been reaffirmed 43 and no
change is expected in the near future. It is important to keep the func-
tion of the tomity theory (the promotion of national unity) in mind
when applying and interpreting the words of the privileges and im-
munities clause.
III. THE SCOPE OF PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
As is true with many constitutional provisions, the phraseology of
the privileges and immunities clause is inherently ambiguous. The clause
provides that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of the citizens of the several states." That language raises
several questions including the definition of citizen; whether corpora-
Republic would have constituted little more than a league of States;
it would not have constituted a Union which now exists.
The purpose of giving Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce was
to solve a similar problem: Controlling the destructive economic competition
among the states in order to unify the country as an economic unit. See Foster-
Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928); West v. Kansas Natural Gas
Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
35. See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975) (brief discussion of
the history of the privileges and immunities clause).
36. See note 29 supra; Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
37. See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975).
38. See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,200)
(discussion of the scope of the privileges and immunities clause).
39. See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975); Toomer v. Witsell,
334 U.S. 385 (1948); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
40. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975).
41. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); P. KAUPER, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 691 (4th ed. 1972); Note, Privileges and Immunites-Tax Dis-
criminating Against Nonresidents Not Cured by Existing Tax Provisions of Neighboring
States-Austin v. New Hampshire, 29 Sw. L.J. 965 (1976).
42. See Antieau, note 27 supra.
43. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975).
1978]
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tions and aliens are protected as citizens of other states and, if not, what
treatment they are due; whether a citizen may protest discrimination
against him by his own state; and the nature of the privileges and im-
munities protected under the clause. Many of these questions have been
resolved by the courts.
A. Citizen
The citizens 44 of a state may not use article IV P & I to challenge
treatment they receive from their own state. 45  The individual com-
plaining must be a citizen of a state other than the state whose actions are
being challenged. In addition, the complainant must be a citizen of some
state.46 Neither the United States government nor the citizens of a
foreign country 47 are protected under the clause.4 8 Corporations49 and
associations"0 also are not considered citizens entitled to the protection
of article IV P & I. The commerce clause and equal protection clause
differ significantly from article IV P & I in this respect. Both of those
clauses protect aliens 5 1 and entities such as corporations. 52 Under the
44. A domiciliary of a state usually is deemed a citizen of that state; these two
words will be used synonymously unless otherwise indicated. A citizen is "[o]ne,
who, under the consititution and law of the United States, or of a particular
state, is a member of the political community, owing allegiance and being enti-
fled to the enjoyment of full civil rights." BLAcK's LAw DICIONARY 310 (rev. 4th
ed. 1968). Citizenship primarily relates to domicile, the individual's allegiance
and intention to permanently reside in a given state. See Douglas v. New York,
N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S.
60 (1920); LaTourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919); Blake v. McClung, 172
U.S. 239 (1898).
45. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872); P. Kauper, note
41, supra at 692.
46. Residents of the District of Columbia and perhaps residents of territories
may not rely on article IV P & I. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); District
of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138 (1909).
47. Aliens are not protected because they are citizens of a foreign country.
See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
48. See United States v. Biloxi Mun. School Dist., 219 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.
Miss. 1963), aff'd, 326 F.2d. 237 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 929 (1964). See
also Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36 (1933).
49. Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537 (1928). See also Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
50. Associations suing as entities rather than as individuals seem to be treated
as corporations. See, e.g., Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537 (1928).
51. The equal protecuon clause clearly covers aliens; in fact, discrimination on
the basis of alienage is a suspect classification. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717
(1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971). The commerce clause also clearly applies to discrimination
against aliens in a commercial setting. The language mentions commerce with
foreign nations and among the several states. U.S. CONsT. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
52. Clearly the commerce clause protects corporations. Bibb v. Navajo
Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325
[Vol. 43
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equal protection and commerce clauses, the individual also need not
challenge a foreign jurisdiction; he often can challenge the activities of
his own state.5 3
B. Residency and Citizenship
A problem confronted by the courts is the treatment of residency
classifications as contrasted with citizenship classifications. It is rare today
to find state legislatures prohibiting noncitizens from receiving benefits
granted state citizens.5 4 It is common, however, to find state legislatures
granting benefits solely to residents, avoiding use of the term "citizen-
ship." This is done by excluding nonresidents or by excluding individu-
als who have not been state residents for a specific period of time (a
durational residency requirement). Courts commonly investigate pur-
ported residency classifications to determine whether they are in fact
citizenship classifications. 55
Durational residency requirements nearly always are treated as
citizenship classifications. "Residency" means to reside in or live in. It
does not mean to live in for a particular period of time. Therefore, the
requirement that a person live in the state for a certain period of time
(durational residency) appears to be a method to determine whether the
person intends to remain in that state for an indefinite period, an indi-
cation of domicile or citizenship. If all state residents receive a benefit
denied nonresidents (low tuition in a state university, for example), the
question is whether this is due to a true residency classification or
whether it is actually citizenship-based discrimination. 56
U.S. 761 (1945). The equal protection clause also protects aliens and corpora-
tions. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); North Dakota Pharmacy Bd. v. Snyder's Drug Stores,
Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973).
53. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 397 U.S. 137 (1970); H.P. Wood & Sons v.
DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553
(1923); Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.,
221 U.S. 229 (1911); Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349
(1908); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
54. For example in the general index to the Missouri Revised Statutes,
"citizenship" appears in four sections, two of which are in the Constitution. "Re-
sidents" occurs in at least fifteen sections, and the term "domicile" in only one
section.
55. See Smith v. Lougman, 245 N.Y. 486, 492, 157 N.E. 753, 755, cert. denied,
275 U.S. 560 (1927). The effect, not the purpose, of the discrimination is con-
trolling.
56. The suggestion that the state could get around article IV P & I by setting
up a residency classification rather than a citizenship classification has been
criticized for quite some time. See Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination
in the Conflicts of Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69 YALE L.J. 1323, 1347 (1960).
Most, if not all, durational residency requirements have been deemed citizenship
classifications; however, a mere residency classification may be exempted from
the parameters of article IV P & I if citizens of the discriminating state are
19781
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The effect of the legislation is the important consideration 7 in de-
termining whether a classification is a residency or citizenship classifica-
tion. The approach taken by the courts is quite clear. 58 The states are
not allowed to circumvent the constitutional language merely by using a
term which is different but which brings about the same result. The
courts carefully scrutinize all residency requirements, as the practical ef-
fect of these requirements is to include citizens and to exclude nonciti-
zens. An argument still can be made that if a state actually disallows the
benefit to its own citizens residing in other states, the requirement may
be treated as a residency rather than citizenship requirement 59 and
thus may be valid. In Austin v. New Hampshire,6° however, the Court indi-
cated that, with respect to taxes, a finding of discrimination against non-
residents was sufficient to invoke the clause and that citizenship did not
matter. The actual differences between citizenship and residency classifi-
cations may be largely illusory because most states now classify on the
basis of residency rather than citizenship; the tendency of the courts is to
find that discrimination on the basis of residency is sufficient to invoke
the clause.61
C. State Action
The courts have consistently held that state action is required in
order for a violation of article IV P & I to exist.62  If a private person,
not acting under authority or color of state or local law, denies a
privilege or immunity to a citizen of another state, there is no violation
of the clause. Although the clause does not by its terms necessarily re-
quire state involvement, 63 it has been so construed. The standard of
excluded because they are residents of some other state. See, e.g., Douglas v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929) in which the Court seemed to accept
the argument that a residency classification is not prohibited by article IV P & I.
57. See Smith v. Lougman, 245 N.Y. 486, 157 N.E. 753, cert. denied, 275 U.S.
560 (1927). See also Currie & Schreter, supra note 56, at 1348.
58. See note 56 and authorities cited note 57 supra.
59. Few recent cases even raise this argument.
60. 420 U.S. 656 (1975).
61. Id. See also Clarke, supra note 2. The issue has been involved in a number
of cases such as Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); LaTourette v. McMas-
ter, 248 U.S. 465 (1919); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898). In Toomer, the
statute dealt with fees discriminating against residents; the state did not even
claim that article IV P & I was not applicable. It may well be that Currie and
Schreter's belief that "the time has come, we believe, for the flat rejection of that
idea" is now reality. Currie & Schreter, supra note 56, at 1347.
62. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 643 (1882). But see Antieau, supra
note 27. Professor Antieau suggests that there is no need for a state action limi-
tation; that the clause confers power on the federal government to insure that all
individuals receive the privileges and immunities to which they are entitled.
63. The clause says that the citizens of each state shall not be denied the
privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several states; it does not say who
it is that is prohibited from denying them those rights. However, see United
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 643 (1882).
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state action required is not clear, but it is likely to be the same standard
applied in fourteenth amendment cases.6 4 Article IV P & I is only a
limit on state action; it does not limit the federal government.
6 5
D. Fundamental Privileges and Immunities
Difficulty arises in the determination whether the state discrimina-
tion relates to a matter concerning a "privilege" or an "immunity." Al-
though this is one of the major areas of litigation under the clause, the
cases have not provided definitions of the terms. In most cases the
courts have assumed that a privilege or immunity is involved and have
gone on to the question whether the privilege or immunity is sufficiently
fundamental to be protected. 66
There appears to be no common thread running through the cases
which would provide a standard to determine whether a particular
privilege or immunity is fundamental. The courts have used broad
categories, e.g., "pursue happiness," 67 and "enter into contracts," 68 to
characterize the basic privileges and immunities and then have asked
64. The Court may use different state action considerations depending upon
which constitutional provision is in question. See, e.g., Gilmore v. City of
Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
These cases suggest that there is a different standard of state action depending
on whether it is a first or fourteenth amendment case. The standard in Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), seems that most likely to be applied.
65. As interpreted, article IV P & I probably is not needed with respect to
the federal government. If the clause had been interpreted to limit state en-
croachment on certain fundamental natural rights of the individual, there might
have been a danger of federal violation. As it is, however, the federal govern-
ment has the power to enforce the clause but probably is not limited by it. See
United States v. Gordon Kiyoshi Hirabayashi, 46 F. Supp. 657 (W.D. Wash.),
aff'd, 320 U.S. 81 (1942). The clause is not a limitation on the District of Colum-
bia. See Duehay v. Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co., 105 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
66. The most cited case detailing which privileges and immunities are suffi-
ciently fundamental to be entitled to protection is Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas.
546, 551 (E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 3,230). In Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 68
(1868), the Court clearly adopted the "fundamental" interpretation. But see Anti-
eau, supra note 27, for a historical analysis of the clause and a theory that the
fundamental interpretation of privileges and immunities is not proper. See also
Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975) in which the Court reiterated the
position of Corfield v. Coryell and indicated that it would continue to follow the
fundamental rights theory of the privileges and immunities clause.
67. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
68. See Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870).
[I]t will be sufficient to say the clause plainly and unmistakenly se-
cures and protects the right of a citizen of one state to pass into any
other state of the union for the purpose of engaging in lawful
commerce, trade, or business without molestation; to acquire per-
sonal property; to take and hold real estate; to maintain actions in
the courts of the states, and to be exempt from any higher taxes or
excises than are imposed by the state upon its own citizens.
Id. at 430. It also was suggested that this was not a comprehensive listing of the
coverage of the clause.
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whether a certain privilege or immunity could be deemed "fundamental"
in a particular fact setting.
In 1902, W.J. Meyers attempted to categorize which activities con-
stituted the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several
states.6 9 He concluded his study with the comment:
[W]ith substantial uniformity the courts declare these privileges
and immunities to consist of what are commonly known as pri-
vate rights, subject only to the police regulations prescribed for
the body of people domiciled within the state ... considering
the condition in which the several states were at the time of
adoption of the Constitution of the United States ... the object
of the clause under consideration would seem to be at the very
least to prevent each state from inflicting upon the citizens of
other states, who should come within its borders, any of the
disabilities of alienage.7 0
69. See Meyers, The Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the Several States, 1
MICH. L. REv. 286, 292-308 (1902). Meyers actually worked in reverse order and
first listed those activities that were not protected by the privilege and immunities
clause. In this category he included:
1. "Political rights" (the right to vote or hold elective office).
2. "Quasi-political rights" (the right to engage in certain professions,
e.g., law, insurance, medicine, dentistry, sale of liquor, and
slaughterinng of animals).
3. The right to enjoy public property held in common for the ben-
efit of the people of the state, except insofar as such enjoyment is
necessary to the enjoyment of the right of migration."
4. "The right of one citizen to attend the same school as that which
another citizen is entitled to attend ...." (upholding the separate
but equal doctrine of race discrimination in schools).
5. "The right to any precise form of process for the protection of
substantive rights."
6. "Rights incident to a status." (e.g., the right to receive dower).
7. "The right to enjoy in that state, by virtue of contracts made
without it, presumptions attached by the law of that state to con-
tracts entered into within it." (e.g., to share in community property
where the individuals were married but not living in a community
property state).
. "The right to import into or to enforce within a state, any right
or other valuable thing acquired outside that state in contravention
of the public policy thereof." (e.g., enforcing the assignment of a
claim for property which was in violation of the state law).
9. "The right to the services of common carriers without discrimi-
nation as to the territorial origin of the commodities shipped."
Meyers went on to list those things protected as privileges and immunities of
citizens of a state. He included:
1. "The right of free ingress and egress."
2. "The right to import and export property."
3. "The right to acquire, hold an enjoy property, real and per-
sonal."
4. "The right to contract."
5. "The right to substantial protection of all substantive rights at no
greater expense than its own citizens are subject to."
See, e.g., Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 256 (1898).
70. Meyers, supra note 69, at 380.
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This effort may have categorized every article IV P & I case decided
prior to 1902. Although not solving all problems, Meyers' list is benefi-
cial. It provides labels and analogies which can be useful in litigating
later cases. The major shortcoming is that state court interpretations of
privileges and immunities are conflicting and many such interpretations
have changed over time.7 1 Another difficulty is that if the categories
are broad enough, virtually anything can fit within them. It would be
hard to imagine any activity in which an individual desired to engage
which could not be included within the "pursuit of happiness," or the
right to "engage in business," or the right to travel. The individual de-
nied admission to a state operated school due to discrimination against
nonresidents could argue that he was denied his right to enter into a
contract with that school 7 2 and thereby was frustrated in his pursuit of
happiness. The difficulty of categorizing privileges and immunities may
be the cause of the requirement that the matter be of a fundamental
nature to merit article IV P & I protection.
Of the most commonly raised issues in recent years, the following
have been held by the courts to be privileges entitled to protection under
the privileges and immunities clause: the right to own 7 3 and sell prop-
erty, to enter into contracts,7 4 to engage in business,7 5 to pursue happi-
ness,7 6 to enjoy free ingress and egress,7 7 to have access to the courts,7 8
to have access to medical care (including abortions),7 9 to import and ex-
port property,8 0 to enjoy equal treatment with respect to taxes,8 x to enjoy
71. For example, Meyers suggests that the right to go to the same school that
another citizen is entitled to attend may not be covered under the privileges and
immunities clause. Id. at 300. However, it is clear that the separate but equal
doctrine is no longer permissible. If a state restricted admissions to all schools,
including private schools, for the use of state citizens, the action probably would
be invalid under Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)..
72. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
73. Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898). Individuals from other states are
entitled to own, possess, sell, dispose of, or otherwise deal with real or personal
property in any state in the union. See also Brown Ketc.ham Iron Works v. Swift,
531 Ind. App. 630, 100 N.E. 584 (1913).
74. Conner v. Elliott, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591 (1855).
75. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (engaging in shrimping is a
common calling and protected by article IV P & I).
76. Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1949).
77. Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525 (1919); Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp.
65 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968).
78. Southern R.R. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950).
79. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
80. Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U.S. 217 (1889). Cases dealing with importing and
exporting property frequently arise under the commerce clause because such
activities often involve interstate commerce.
81. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975); Steele v. Searle, 483
F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1973).
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remedies similar to those enjoyed by resident creditors, 82 and to rely on
the statute of limitations on an equal basis with state residents. 83 Cases
specifically involving the term "immunities" usually involved discrimina-
tory taxes against nonresidents; citizens of other states are entitled to
immunity from such discriminatory taxes.84 It also has been held that
the privileges and immunities clause does not provide protection from
state discrimination against nonresidents regarding the right to sell
liquor,85 to vote in state elections, 86 to get a divorce,87 to receive dower, 8
or to practice certain professions. 89 These matters were held to be
either not included within the privileges and immunities of the citizens
of the various states or not sufficiently fundamental to be worthy of
82. Blake v. McClung, 176 U.S. 59 (1900); Berger v. Kingsport Press, 89
F.2d 444 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 738 (1937); Kelly v. Knott, 120 Fla. 580,
163 So. 64 (1935), rev'd on otker grounds sub nom. United States v. Knott, 298 U.S.
544 (1936); In re Flukes, 157 Mo. 725, 57 S.W. 545 (1900). But see Tanner v.
DeVinney, 101 Neb. 46, 161 N.W. 1052 (1917); Wierse v. Thomas, 145 N.C. 261,
59 S.E. 58 (1907); Sweeney v. Hunter, 145 Pa. 363, 22 A. 653 (1891).
83. See Blake v. McClung, 176 U.S. 59 (1900); Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 502
(1951); Annot., 55 A.L.R.3d 1158 (1974). See also cases cited note 82 supra.
84. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975).
85. See Mulligan v. United States, 120 F. 98 (8th Cir. 1903); Premiere-Pabst
Sales Corp. v. McNutt, 17 F. Supp. 708 (S.D. Ind. 1935); Premiere-Pabst Sales
Corp. v. Gross Cup, 12 F. Supp. 970 (E.D. Pa. 1935), affd, 298 U.S. 226 (1936);
Welsh v. State, 126 Ind. 71, 25 N.E. 883 (1890); Austin v. State, 10 Mo. 591
(1847).
86. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875).
87. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975). See also Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 223
(1973).
88. Ferry v. Corbett, 258 U.S. 609 (1922); Ferry v. Spokane P. & S. Ry., 258
U.S. 314 (1922). But see Bennett v. Harris, 8 N.W. 222 (Wis. 1881).
89. See Keely v. Evans, 271 F. 520 (D. Ore. 1921), appeal dismissed, 257 U.S.
667 (1922); Brents v. Stone, 60 F. Supp. 82 (E.D. Ill. 1945). But see Hawkins v.
Moss, 503 F.2d 1171, 1180 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928 (1974). See also
Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 1151 (1970), dealing with architect licensing and fees. As to
the practice of medicine, see, e.g., People v. Phippin, 70 Mich. 6, 37 N.W. 888
(1888); Ex parte Spinney, 10 Nev. 323 (1875). See also Meyers supra note 69, at
294. Some other activities like selling liquor, Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 129 (1874), and the slaughtering of animals are deemed special activities
entitled to special regulation. See Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1872). Cases involving admission to the practice of law have caused major dif-
ficulties. Most cases challenging the validity of bar examination procedures have
involved the question of whether reciprocity provisions are constitutional or
whether an individual who has a license to practice in another state must be
admitted solely on the basis of his license from the foreign state. The reciprocity
cases do not raise article IV P & I problems since discrimination is in favor of
those who are admitted by reciprocity. Those who are not so admitted are
treated like state residents; they must take the local bar exam. Thus, the cases
involving the question of whether an individual who has a foreign license ought
to be admitted to practice without examination in a state do not raise article IV P
& I problems since the challenger cannot show that there is any discrimination
against nonresidents. The state merely requires foreign attorneys to do exactly
the same thing the local attorneys are required to do in order to be licensed in
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protection. Also excluded from coverage because not deemed privileges
or immunities are political rights 90 and quasi-political rights.91
If a state activity adversely affects a privilege or immunity, it may be
constitutionally invalid if the privilege or immunity concerns a funda-
mental right. It may be impossible to define the term "fundamental"
precisely. 92 The more essential or important an activity to the preserva-
tion and enjoyment of life, liberty, property, and the ability to earn a
living, the more likely it will be included in the "fundamental" category
due protection under article IV P & I.
that state. See Hawkins v. Moss, 503 F.2d 1171 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
928 (1974). However, by requiring residency or citizenship for purposes of being
admitted to practice within the state, or for purposes of taking the bar exam,
there is discrimination against nonresidents with respect to their seeking lawful
employment, and article IV P & I should be considered. See Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d
1164 (1974); Note, Residence Requirements for Admission to the Bar, 36 ALB. L. REv.
762 (1972); Note, Residence Requirements for Initial Admission to the Bar: a Com-
promise Proposal for Change, 56 CORNELL L. Rv. 831 (1971). The courts have re-
jected a number of arguments which the states have propounded to satisfy the
requirement that the regulation be rationally related to the applicant's fitness or
capacity to practice law including:
(1) that a lawyer must appreciate the spirit of American institu-
tions; (2) that a lawyer must take an oath to support the constitu-
tion; (3) that lawyers must be kept accessible to clients and subject
to control of the Bar; (4) that the practice of law is a privilege not a
right; (5) that a lawyer is an officer of the court; (6) that it would
be difficult to train civil law attorneys in the common law.
Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 1149 (1975). See also Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners,
317 F. Supp. 1350 (D.C.N.C. 1970); In re Application of Park, 484 P.2d 690
(Alas. 1971); Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 496 P.2d
1264 (1972). But see Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257 (D.C.N.M.), aff'd,
409 U.S. 1020 (1972); Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391 (D.C. Miss. 1971);
Webster v. Wofford, 321 F. Supp. 1259 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Keenan v. Board of
Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970); In re Bonam, 255 Mich. 59,
237 N.W. 45 (1931); In re Admission to the Bar, 61 Neb. 58, 84 N.W. 611
(1900); Baker v. Varser, 240 N.C. 260, 82 S.E.2d 90 (1954). See also In re Robin-
son, 117 N.W. 352 (Neb. 1908).
Perhaps the best approach to cases involving licensing would be to recognize
that the applicant is seeking lawful employment or pursuing a lawful occupation,
admit that it comes within the parameters of article IV P & I, admit that it is a
fundamental privilege, and ask whether there is a reasonable basis for requiring
residency or citizenship.
90. See note 69 supra.
91. Quasi political rights are those closely associated with political activities,
e.g., the right to practice law. See Annot., 61 A.L.R.3d 264 (1975), Annot., 45
A.L.R.2d 1065 (1956), Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 1149 (1973). See also Hawkins v.
Moss, 503 F.2d 1171, 1176 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928 (1974); Brents v.
Stone, 60 F. Supp. 82 (E.D. Ill. 1945); Keely v. Evans, 271 F. 520 (D. Ore. 1921),
appeal dismissed, 257 U.S. 667 (1922); In re Bonan, 237 N.W. 45 (Mich. 1931).
92. In Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870), Judge Washington
stated that listings of privileges and immunities within the clause's coverage were
not comprehensive. The courts have never tried to define the exact limits of
article IV P & I.
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Some of the cases presently being litigated to determine whether the
matter is sufficiently fundamental to be protected by article IV P & I
are: the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a3 under which a state court
refuses to hear cases involving citizens of other states, although access to
the courts usually is considered a protected privilege; extradition, 4
which concerns only nonresidents because residents are turned over on
detainers; bar examination procedures, 95 which impose residency re-
quirements although practicing law may be considered seeking lawful
employment; college admissions, 96 where nonresidents are denied equal
access to state institutions of higher education (this could be a restriction
on entering into contracts9 7 and pursuing happiness); nonresident col-
lege tuition; 98 limitations imposed on nonlocal residents by state and
federal laws concerning the right to purchase firearms;9 " and prefer-
ences to state residents in securing employment and state contracts.100
It is apparent that the courts have been reluctant to define in ad-
vance those privileges and immunities which are essential or fundamen-
tal. The courts have preferred to approach the problem on a case-by-
case basis and to determine incrementally which activities are or are not
protected by the clause. This approach does not provide advance notice
to the states, but does allow the courts to adjust to changing norms of
behavior, morality, and social and economic acceptability.
E. Standard of Review
The Supreme Court has indicated that the standard of review
applicable in article IV P & I cases is one of reasonableness; 101 the state
93. Akins v. Underwood, 520 F.2d 890 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017
(1975); Johnson v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 66 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 1954);
Whitehead v. Whitehead, 13 N.G. App. 393, 185 S.E.2d 706 (1972); Zurick v.
Inman, 426 S.W.2d 767 (Tenn. 1968). See also Douglas v. New York, N.H. &
H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929); Currie & Schreter, note 56 supra.
94. Sanders v. Conine, 506 F.2d 530 (10th Cir. 1974); U.S. v. Guy, 456 F.2d
1157 (8th Cir. 1972); Arizona v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1003 (1970).
95. E.g., Hawkins v. Moss, 503 F.2d 1171 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928
(1974). See also note 171 infra; Annot., 61 A.L.R.3d 264 (1975), Annot., 45
A.L.R.2d 1065 (1956), Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 1149 (1973).
96. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Bernstein, Residency Laws and the
College Student, 1 J. oFL. & EDUC. 349 (1972). See also Clarke, supra note 2.
97. Cf Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (race discrimination and
private schools).
98. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). The question may be whether the
tuition is excessive in light of the fact that nonresidents may have contributed
nothing to the state treasury to help pay for the college education. See also au-
thorities cited note 96 supra.
99. People v. Perez, 67 N.Y. Misc. 689, 325 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1971).
100. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940); Heim v. McCall, 239
U.S. 175 (1915); City and County of Denver v. Bossie, 266 P. 214 (Colo. 1928);
Ebbeson v. Board of Public Educ., 18 Del. Ch. 37, 156 A. 286 (1931).
101. The standard of review concept is similar to that in equal protection
analysis. The issue is the extent to which the state activity is suited to ac-
[Vol. 43
16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss1/7
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
action which treats noncitizens differently from state citizens must bear a
real and substantial relationship to a valid state goal. Noncitizens may be
discriminated against only if it is reasonable to do so. In Toomer v. Wit-
sell' 0 2 the fee for nonresident fishing licenses was one hundred times
greater than for resident licenses. The Supreme Court invalidated the
nonresident fee because the state was unable to show that it was one
hundred times more expensive to enforce its fisheries laws against non-
residents. Because the only valid justification for the higher fee was the
cost of enforcement, the fee was invalid as it was not reasonably related
to that expense. Under this reasonableness standard, the trial court must
make an independent evaluation of the state's justification for the differ-
ence in treatment and determine whether it is reasonable.
The burden is on the challenger to show that there is in fact dis-
crimination based on state citizenship. In the absence of such a showing,
there is no article IV P & I question. 10 3 Once discrimination has been
established, the reasonableness of that discrimination is at issue. This
determination of reasonableness involves two considerations: whether
the state is pursuing a valid goal, and whether the means utilized by the
state are reasonably designed to accomplish that goal.
The burden of proof on the reasonableness issue is initially on the
challenger. Some cases have suggested that the burden is on the chal-
lenger to disprove every hypothesis which would justify a finding that the
discrimination is reasonable.10 4  This would be an extremely difficult
complishing a valid goal but does not rest upon invalid assumptions or cause
improper discrimination. In this regard the standard used in article IV P & I
cases is similar to the reasonableness standard in sex discrimination cases. Clas-
sifications based on citizenship are "valid only if the classification is reasonable
and is relevant to a policy other than one of parochial and hostile discrimination
against the outlander." Currier & Schreter, supra note 56, at 1348. See also Austin
v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975) (it is sufficient if the state has secured a
reasonably fair distribution of burdens and if no intentional discrimination has
been practiced against nonresidents); Perry, Constitutional "Fairness": Notes on
Equal Protection and Due Process,63 VA. L. REv. 383 (1977).
102. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
103. See Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 121
(1920); Hawkins v. Moss, 503 F.2d 1171 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928
(1974); Borden v. Selden, 259 Iowa 808, 146 N.W.2d 306 (1966); Wheeler v.
State, 12 Vt. 363, 249 A.2d 887 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 4 (1969).
104. Borden v. Selden, 259 Iowa 808, 146 N.W.2d 306 (1966); Wheeler v.
State, 1? Vt. 361, 249 A.2d 887 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 4 (1969). It is
difficult to determine which party actually bears the risk of nonpersuasion in
these cases. Most cases say that the challenger has the burden of showing both
the discrimination and its unreasonableness. However, in Austin v. New Hampshire
the Supreme Court suggested that where the state discrimination is on the basis
of citizenship, a valid justification must be present. It appears that the Court will
not assume that a justification or a substantial relationship between the chosen
means and a valid state interest exists. It can be.argued that the state must pre-
sent at least a plausible basis for citizenship-based discrimination. The Court
stated "'something more is required than bald assertion'--by the state court ...
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undertaking, as numerous hypotheses could be envisioned to support
citizenship-based discrimination. A better approach is to require the
challenger to negate the most likely or plausible hypotheses, e.g., with
regard to higher nonresident fishing licenses, that the increased cost is
fairly apportioned according to the burden of enforcing fishing laws
against nonresidents. When the challenger has met this requirement, the
state may attempt to justify the legislation by hypothesizing other consid-
erations which may have led to the passage of the statute. The chal-
lenger must then meet these arguments. It seems unlikely that there is
or should be a requirement that the challenger anticipate and negate in
advance any possible justification the state may be able to envision.
Reasonableness analysis requires the identification of the interest the
state is seeking to promote. 0 5 If the state is pursuing an impermissible
goal, the discrimination will be invalid. 10 6 The limits of permissible state
goals are being litigated currently; there are few clear-cut guidelines
available. However, useful analogies can be drawn from cases decided
under the commerce clause. 10 7  Both the commerce clause and- the
privileges and immunities clause are part of the original body of the Con-
stitution and were included for a similar purpose-the promotion of
national economic unity. It is logical that the considerations relating to
valid state interests would be similar under both clauses.' 08 The Su-
to establish the validity of a taxing statute that on its face discriminates against
nonresidents." 420 U.S. 656, 665, citing Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 418
(1952).
105. The valid state interest requirement is only that the state must be seeking
to accomplish a goal which is one it may validly pursue. Practically, this limitation
is slight; the state may couch whatever it seeks to do in terms of the health,
safety, or welfare of its citizens and thereby establish the existence of a valid state
interest. The state must be careful, for example, not to couch its statute in terms
of promoting local industry at the expense of interstate industry, establishing or
enhancing a religion, or keeping out-of-state, business from competing with local
industry. If the noncitizens are excluded merely because of a policy of "paro-
chial, hostile discrimination against the outlander," it is unlikely that the court
will deem the state to have a valid interest. Currie & Schreter, supra note 56, at
1348. The concept of a valid state goal is related closely to the question of
reasonableness, in that the means adopted to accomplish the goal must be di-
rectly related to and reasonably likely to advance its accomplishment.
106. See Alaska-Lynden Transp., Inc. v. State, 532 P.2d 700 (Alas. 1975)
(economic discrimination between residents and nonresidents).
107. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). See also Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
108. The similarity of interests is apparent in language from In re Schechter,
63 F. 695 (D. Minn. 1894):
[When a state undertakes, by statutory regulation, to deprive citi-
zens of other states, who deal in sound articles of commerce pro-
duced in other states, of that presumption of honesty and innocence
of wrong which it indulges in favor of the dealers in its own prod-
ucts, and which the law raises in favor of every man, it very effectu-
ally deprives the citizens of other states of the most valuable
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preme Court recognized this similarity of interests in Hughes v. Alexan-
dria Scrap Corp., ' 0 9 by drawing from article IV P & I cases to decide a
commerce clause issue. The only clearly impermissible state goal is
economic isolation from the other states." 0 Valid state goals include
solving local health and safety problems"' but do not include solving
local economic problems by discouraging competition from out of
state; 112 that would be inconsistent with the policy of national economic
unity." 3  States may conserve natural resources, 114 but may not reserve
them solely for the use of their own residents." 5  A state may not pro-
hibit the sale of out of state goods within its borders."
6
States should not lose cases on the ground that there is not a valid
state interest; success or failure often depends on the phrasing of the
109. 426 U.S. 794 (1976). Scrap contains a good discussion of the concept of
economic isolation and its limits. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes
one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated
will of course depend upon the nature of the local interest involved,
and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). See also Foster-Fountain
Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262
U.S. 553 (1923); Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915); West v. Kansas Natural
Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911); Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S.
349 (1908); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
110. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
111. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Sligh v.
Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915).
112. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). But see Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
113. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Toomer v. Witsell,
334 U.S. 385 (1948).
114. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S.
391 (1876). Sie also Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
115. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). There was an argument
made in Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928) that the state
could reserve those things owned by the state for use by state citizens. See
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976), where the Court ad-
dressed that argument and apparently reverted to the McCready approach, saying
that if the state discriminates against interstate commerce with respect to the
provision of state money or assets it does not violate the commerce clause. Since
McCready was also an article IV P & I case, it would seem that such state activity
with respect to its own resources would be permissible. On the other hand, if the
state seeks to regulate what private entities do with their own or state resources
there may be a different result. The state may discriminate against interstate
commerce and noncitizens in the disposition of its own money or assets. How-
ever, if the state tries to control what others do with state resources, there may
be an article IV P & I violation. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). But see
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159 (Alas. 1977), review granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3283
(No. 77-324, Nov. 1, 1977).
116. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Min-
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state interest relied upon. The state's attorney should carefully charac-
terize the state interest as one relating to health, safety, or morals, and
avoid purely economic justifications. 1 7 If the state does desire to pro-
tect local economic interests, great caution must be exercised. 118 Cases
such as Toomer v. Witsell, " 9 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 120 and Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp. 121 establish the basic criteria: any plausible pur-
pose or goal not at variance with the unity of the country as an economic
entity probably will suffice as a valid state goal under article IV P & I.
The means adopted by the state to move toward a valid goal must be
reasonably related to the accomplishment of that goal. 2 2 If the means
involve different treatment for noncitizens, this discrimination must be
reasonable. 23 Reasonableness is determined by balancing 1 24 the federal
interest in a unified country 12 5 and the individual's interests in his right
of travel, ' 2 6 his right to engage in a lawful business, 127 etc., against the
state's valid interests 128 in conserving natural resources, 129 returning
state residents' tax dollars to state residents in the form of state ben-
efits, 130 or requiring nonresidents to pay their own way. 1 3 1 A state can
assess a higher fee for nonresident hunting and fishing licenses, but the
fee must be reasonable, i.e., substantially related to the actual cost of
program enforcement with respect to nonresidents." 2 It appears that
this standard is similar to that applied in recent sex discrimination
cases. 3 3 In these cases, the Court has required that the classification or
state action serve important governmental objectives and be substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives.
117. See note 109 supra.
118. See cases cited notes 109-117supra.
119. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
120. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
121. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
122. See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975); Toomer v. Witsell,
334 U.S. 385 (1948).
123. See cases cited notes 103, 111 supra.
124. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976); Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385
(1948).
125. See cases cited notes 30-39 supra.
126. See cases cited note 77 supra.
127. See cases cited notes 75, 82 supra.
128. See cases cited note 109 supra.
129. See cases cited note 114 supra.
130. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976); Doe v. Bol-
ton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
131. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). See also Evansville-Vander-
burgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
132. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
133. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Boran, 429 U.S. 190
(1976); Weinberg v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
[Vol. 43
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One of the most surprising methods of achieving a valid state goal
to be approved by the Court is the state's right to expend state money
for the exclusive benefit of state citizens under both the commerce
clause 134 and article IV P & I.13 5 In Doe v. Bolton 136 the Court invali-
dated a state prohibition on performing abortions for nonresidents in all
hospitals located within the state. The implication was that, if the state
regulation had been concerned with the expenditure of state monies, the
state could discriminate in favor of its own citizens (residents) without
having to concern itself with an article IV P & I problem. The state
merely would be denying state funds and the use of state facilities to
nonresidents; it would not be depriving them of their privilege of get-
ting an abortion within the boundaries of the state. 137 In Beal v. Doe, 13 8
Maher v. Roe, ' 39 and Poelker v. Doe ' 40 the states merely limited the extent
to which state money could be used for non-therapeutic abortions: there
was no discrimination on the basis of residency. Therefore, article IV P
& I did not come into play. If a state were to take an intermediate posi-
tion and limit the use of state money to providing abortions for state
residents only, article IV P & I also would not apply. When the state is
expending state money it appears to be exempt from the strictures of
article IV P & I.
It is anomalous that a state may impose the same tax on residents
and nonresidents alike, but may provide services supported by state tax
money only to state residents.' 4 1 This limitation on article IV P & I may
be the cause of increased use of equal protection analysis to protect
those who have traveled in interstate commerce. The equal protection
clause does cover discrimination in the expenditure of state funds. 42
This limitation on" article IV P & I is not rational if state citizens
receive state benefits to the complete exclusion of noncitizens.143 If the
service is not readily available from private sources, and the noncitizen is
134. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
135. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385
(1948); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S.
391 (1876).
136. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
137. The issue could arise where there are a limited number of veterinary
colleges and a student wishes to attend a veterinary school other than in his
home state.
138. 97 S. Ct. 2366 (1977).
139. 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977).
140. 97 S. Ct. 2391 (1977).
141. See cases cited notes 122, 130 supra.
142. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
143. Many individuals living in border towns work in a state other than that in
which they live. Under the expenditure of state money analysis, they can be
excluded from the state benefits they have helped finance merely because they
live in the wrong place.
19781
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willing to pay the cost or a fair share of the cost of providing the service,
it is difficult to argue that he should be totally excluded. Many states
exclude nonresidents or favor residents when making admissions deci-
sions for state schools1 44 and hospitals. 145 If receiving education or
hospital care is a fundamental privilege, the real issue might be whether
the states can totally exclude nonresidents or merely make them pay their
own way. Justice Brennan's dissent in Maher rejected the suggestion that
"there is a basic difference between direct State interference with a pro-
tected activity and State encouragement of alternate activity concurrent
with legislative policy." 146 However, the majority of the Court has rec-
ognized this distinction and allowed such allocations of state money un-
less that action violates some other constitutional provision, such as the
equal protection clause. Other than the generalization that states need
not spend state money to promote the interests of nonresidents, no clear
guidelines are available.
IV. AN EXAMPLE OF THE DILEMMA: Hicklin v. Orbeck
The difficulty which develops from the Court's position that the
states may discriminate in favor of their own citizens in the distribution
of state monies and resources is illustrated by Hicklin v. Orbeck.147 The
Alaska Supreme Court upheld an Alaska hire law requiring recipients of
state oil and gas leases to give preferences to Alaska residents for jobs
arising out of those leases. Under article IV P & I, the state can give
preferences to state residents when the state is doing the hiring and di-
rectly expending state money to pay the individuals hired.14  However,
the state may not require all businesses in the state to give preferences to
state citizens, because that would be an unreasonable regulation of the
fundamental privilege to seek and engage in lawful employment. 49 An
argument in favor of the Alaska provision is that the state has an interest
in solving its own economic problems before, providing jobs to individu-
als from other states. However, as the Hicklin dissent pointed out, the
concept of federalism (that the states must sink or swim together with
respect to economic matters) envisioned by both the commerce clause
and article IV P & I must be considered.
The Hicklin majority took the view that the state has a valid interest
in providing economic benefits to its own residents; however, analysis of
144. This issue becomes crucial when similar training is not available in pri-
vate schools.
145. See cases cited notes 122, 130 supra.
146. 97 S. Ct. at 2388 (Brennan, J., dissenting) quoting from Singleton v. Wulff,
428 U.S. 106, 122 (1976).
147. 565 P.2d 159 (Alas. 1977), review granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3283 (No. 77-324,
Nov. 1, 1977).
148. See Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915); Hein v. McCall, 239 U.S.
175 (1915). See also cases cited note 135 supra.
149. See cases cited note 135 supra.
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this problem should go further. In McCreedy v. Virginia 150 and Corfield v.
Coryell 5 it was held that the state could restrict the use of its own re-
sources to state residents. However, in the Alaska case, the state did not
seek merely to limit state resources to state residents; it sold and leased
state resources to individuals and required those individuals to give
preferential hiring to Alaska residents.
Alaska has chosen a method of solving its economic problems that is
neither clearly permissible nor impermissible under article IV P & I.
The provision is tied to state resources, but being one step removed,
resembles outright regulation. Many of the employers covered by the
lease agreements are those who would be most likely to hire nonresi-
dents. Because Alaska has such vast holdings of land and resources, it
has a tremendous ability to control employment through its power to sell
and lease property with conditions attached favoring state residents. This
power may be in many ways as great as its power to regulate.
The Hicklin court suggested that many of the cases urged by the
defendant were inappropriate because they were commerce clause cases
rather than privileges and immunities cases. Commerce clause cases are
relevant to an article IV P & I claim because the two clauses promote the
same concept of federalism, national economic unity, and the need for
the elimination of discrimination against nonresidents. The Hicklin dis-
senters were correct in their suggestion that the court overlooked the
basic purpose of article IV P & I.
Hicklin could have been upheld on other grounds. It would be
plausible for a court to hold that, because the hiring law only discrimi-
nated against nonresidents and not against noncitizens (an Alaskan citi-
zen who had not resided in Alaska also would be excluded from the
preferential hiring), article IV P & I was inapplicable. That distinction,
to some extent, is still upheld in the regulatory field, although the Court
clearly has indicated that with respect to taxes, a finding of discrimina-
tion against nonresidents is sufficient to make article IV P & I applica-
ble.152
The concept that the states must sink or swim together is being ig-
nored by Alaska. That state is trying to solve its unemployment problem
while disregarding the unemployment problem of the rest of the United
States. The regulation upheld in Hicklin also inhibits free movement
among the states. Unemployed individuals often move to other states in
search of jobs; such moves become risky if the job-seeker is precluded
from taking a job in a foreign jurisdiction prior to the time he moves. It
is a common practice for unemployed individuals to communicate with
prospective employers in foreign jurisdictions and to move only after
150. 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
151. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
152. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975). See also note 61 supra.
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employment is found. Their ability to do this in Alaska is substantially
restricted because they must move to the state prior to being able to
compete on an equal basis with others. This is exactly the type of prob-
lem that article IV P & I was designed to prevent.
Allowing the states to circumvent article IV P & I by tying their
regulations to distribution of state benefits would emasculate the clause.
The states then could favor their own citizens merely by stating that the
favoritism or preference regulations were incident to state benefits. Such
a rule also would give the states with substantial natural resources a clear
advantage over the states with less resources and allow states to provide
tremendous economic benefits to local residents. Such regulations also
could give rise to retaliatory action by other states which could include
restricting the employment of nonresidents by state contractors, exclud-
ing nonresidents from state parks and other state facilities, or imposing
substantial user fees on nonresidents for the use of state facilities.
The resolution of these competing issues will be left to the Supreme
Court. It is possible that article IV P & I will become the equivalent of a
new interstate equal protection clause as it is relied upon more often in
the future. Whether article IV P & I will be a substantial limitation on
state discrimination against nonresidents may be determined by the final
resolution of the issues raised in Hicklin v. Orbeck.
V. CONCLUSION
There is a tendency to overwork the equal protection clause in deal-
ing with state discrimination because it is the first to come to mind
and, in many ways, provides the broadest protection. One must not
overlook other constitutional provisions which can be helpful in many
situations. If one can show state action that discriminates against nonciti-
zens (a showing of nonresidence often will suffice); that concerns a fun-
damental privilege or immunity (privilege and immunity may be subject
to a broad interpretation); and that is unreasonable, a case of an article
IV P & I violation is made out. As the Supreme Court retreats from the




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss1/7
